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Exposing an Imposter! Bush is a Sham Conservative!

Impostor: How George W. Bush Bankrupted America and Betrayed the Reagan Legacy by Bruce Bartlett. Hardcover: 320 pages. (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2006) Amazon Price: $16.38.

An Imposter, a Pretend Conservative!!

Review by Ryan Setliff

Bush came into office riding on a tide of popular backlash directed at the scandal-plagued Clinton administration. Bush even went so far as to present himself as the consummate Reaganite. Nonetheless, G.W. Bush’s last few years of leadership from foreign policy to domestic issues have been uninspiring and characterized by a profound increase of government spending, record budget deficits, an exploding national debt, a reckless interventionist foreign policy, and a post-9/11 barb-wiretapped police state that completely eviscerates the Bill of Rights.

The ill-conceived 2005 Bush nomination of Harriet Miers to the Supreme Court marked the dramatic opening of a fissure within Republican ranks over the sitting President. Miers had no judicial bench experience but was rather a lottery commissioner with questionable business dealings, and she was a financial contributor to the Democratic Party. In fact, many professed Republican stalwarts began to question Bush’s leadership once and for all after this lamentable move.

The Bush track record speaks for itself. On foreign policy, the avoidable Iraq War was justified on false pretenses of an elusive national security threat that was never substantiated. It was all to overthrow a dictator that the United States hypocritically propped up and supported for two decades. By 2004, at the behest of his spin-doctors, Bush was campaigning for reelection and boasting that his administration was trying to spread global democracy to the four corners of the earth. The elusive Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) went down the Orwellian memory well. He simply found a new neo-Jacobin rationale for his foreign meddling and the Iraq War which is all the more spurious. His economic, fiscal and budgetary track record is no less problematic. As Bartlett documents, Bush never vetoes spending bills coming out of Congress, and he has presided over the largest budget deficits in history. His economic and fiscal policies are misguided and reckless. The U.S. government is one step away from insolvency, and may soon turn to monetary inflation in order to pay its bills.

Bush’s Questionable Economic and Fiscal Policies

The Bush administration’s economic policies are highly questionable to say the least. Bush has presided over an exorbitant increase of federal spending since taking office. As much as GOP stalwarts would like to blame the Democrats for the Big Government which we toil under, the Congress has a Republican majority, and Bush has an unused veto power. And just look how our Republican-majority government runs things? In fact, Bush never vetoes any spending appropriations bill sent to him by Congress. In 2004, it was revealed that Bush’s first term had seen the largest increase in domestic discretionary spending in postwar history, surpassing even Lyndon B. Johnson (p. 135). Despite the Bush tax cut, the failure to control federal spending most assuredly will lead to a future tax hike in the near future. A drastic future tax hike might not happen under Bush’s watch, but will be attributable to his policies nonetheless. Bartlett goes so far as to explain how Bill Clinton actually did a much better job wrestling the federal budget and the debt monster. I concede that Bartlett is correct.

As a background to his analysis of Bush’s economic and fiscal policies, Bartlett compares and contrasts the core tenets of both supply-side economics much revered by Reagan with the disproved Keynesian economics long cherished by the Political Left. In the 1970s, the supply-siders came forth and affirmed, “the Keynesians had it all wrong. It’s not spending that drives the economy, but production. And production occurs only when people and businesses have an incentive to produce” (p. 48). Reagan adopted this policy which favored tax cuts on the marginal income tax rates as the cornerstone of his economic policy. Bush had professed to learn the failure of his father’s leadership namely breaking his no-tax pledge. George W. Bush even marketed himself as a Reaganite prior to the 2000 election and even more so during the reelection in 2004. However, as Bartlett judiciously observes, George W. Bush is no Ronald Reagan. Bush is a de facto Keynesian as far as economic policy is concerned.

Bartlett profiles the so called Bush tax cut with incisive analysis. He astutely illustrates the manifest imprudence of its implementation, and he makes it clear why the tax cut has failed to induce any meaningful economic recovery. As Tom Donlan of Barron’s stated, “All we ever wanted, all we ever need is lower tax rates for all taxpayers; instead the President gives us a witch’s brew” (p. 55). As Bartlett surmises, Bush’s tax-cuts were not across the board. Moreover, it was implemented with Machiavellian calculation to target and reward key political constituencies — corporate as well as individual. Republican Congressman Bill Archer, former chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, complained that “all the new tax gimmicks would make fundamental tax reform harder to accomplish in the future.” With clarity and insight, Bruce Bartlett illustrates how the Bush tax cuts were implemented, and illustrates why they have been an abysmal failure. As Princeton University economist Uwe Reinhardt stated, “Judging by their own words, President Bush and his advisers have all reverted to Keynesianism” (p. 52).

Bush has had a marked tendency to look first to subsidies and government assistance to address any perceived economic hiccup. Bush “seldom misses an opportunity to subsidize or bail out big business that are in trouble,” which is in sharp contrast to Ronald Reagan’s free-market philosophy. Bartlett notes,

A good example is Bush’s decision to give the airline industry billions of dollars in government aid in the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. Critics pointed out that the enabling legislation was passed with unseemly haste — just days after the attacks — and that there was a lack of consideration to any alternatives. The size of the aid package was so large… that it exceeded the market capitalization of the six largest airlines. It also brought forth predictable and unjustified requests for government aid from a long list of other industries. (p. 118)

While the Republicans actually went a long way towards free-market reforms in the agriculture sector in 1996, the 2001 farm bill signed into law by Bush in May 2002, “raised spending by almost $90 billion above the previous law and was estimated by the Congressional Budget Office to cost over $470 billion over five years—almost $100 billion per year” (p. 91). As CNN reported, Bush smugly proclaimed:

This bill is generous and will provide a safety net for farmers, and it will do so without encouraging overproduction and depressing prices," Bush said at a signing ceremony. “It will allow farmers and ranchers to plan and operate based on market realities, not government dictates.” (CNN.com “Bush signs $190 billion farm bill”)

As if anticipating criticisms from sound economists, Bush dismissed the sound criticisms of price supports and subsidies that most conservative economists have come to agree on. These agriculture policies spelled a disaster in all subsequent efforts to encourage other nations to bring down their subsidies in trade talks for an equal playing field in global markets. The Europeans have refused to reform their agriculture and are quick to point to new U.S. agriculture policies as a convenient rationale (p. 91). Whereas, the GOP once lauded the “freedom to farm” in the mid-1990s, and initiated market reforms, both the Republican Congress and the Bush administration have supported the old familiar, tried-and-failed Soviet agriculture policies.

Bush’s trade record is not without blemish either. An observer should be quick to note the duplicity in rhetoric and policy. I stand aghast at Bush’s covert efforts to spearhead the North American Union, and work towards economic-political integration throughout the Americas, although Bartlett makes no mention of this. Bartlett surmises that Bush has the worst trade record since Herbert Hoover. He chronicles an array of duplicitous double-dealing where Bush presents himself as an advocate of “free trade,” but has a mish-mash record. For example, Bush basically supports protectionist policies only to have his policy advisors dub such policies as “free trade.” In 2002, Bush signed off on the imposition of a 30 percent tariff on steel imports. In amazing bit of doublespeak, Bush Trade Representative Zoellick explained that this was a major step towards free trade. Economists Joseph Francois and Laura Baughman estimated that this policy led to the loss of eight jobs in steel-consuming businesses for every job supposedly saved among steel producers. In fact, it cost American consumers $450,000 per job saved (p. 88).

Closing Salvos

Needless to say, the Bush Presidency has been a monumental disappointment. This is illustrative of the reality that a viable, principled conservative movement can find little redeeming qualities in the GOP, much less prospects for meaningful reform and taming the leviathan of Big Government. As National Journal columnist John Maggs has noted, there is little underlying conservatism present at all within the Bush agenda:

Based on his actions, Bush has abandoned many traditional conservative causes. Instead of trying to rein in entitlements, he has created a costly new one; instead of trying to reduce the reach of the federal government in education, Bush has extended it; instead of trying control discretionary spending, Bush has agreed to virtually every expansion that Congress sought. Familiar targets of conservative budget cutters—farm subsidies, job training, import tariffs — have all gotten healthy increases under Bush. (pp. 137-38)

Bartlett surmises, “Bush is more like Richard Nixon — a man who used the right to pursue his agenda, but was never really part of it. In short, he is an imposter, a pretend conservative” (p. 1). Bush tries to stake his policies on whatever compromise and sellouts he thinks will buttress his popularity and political fortunes. Nonetheless, he has failed abysmally at staking those claims. As Bartlett declares, the Bush administration sees “no limits to state power as long as it is used to advance what they think is right.” (p. 1).

All things considered, Bush would have been better off forsaking his familiar finger-in-the-wind style of governance. The President always seems apt to look which way the wind is blowing in ascertaining his leadership decisions—and on top of that, he isn’t very perceptive which way the wind is blowing. One could perhaps pragmatically rationalize Bush’s effort to secure the allegiance of the Hispanic community with his immigration program, or his overtures to the elderly with his drug entitlement program. Nonetheless, his parlor games of being ‘all things to all people’ only reaped bitter fruits, and gave him neither what he desired or hope would come of his rank compromise. Bartlett concludes, “Arguably, all of Bush’s clever political ploys, in which he abandoned long-held conservative principles, ended up only hurting him politically. He would have done just as well electorally and possibly much better if he had stuck to those principles” (p. 16). This is undoubtedly true. But of course, Bush’s principles are gelatinous and ever-changing.

Bruce Bartlett professes,

It is my hope that those who remain in the Reagan wing of the Republican Party can come together to support a candidate in 2008 who will repudiate Bush’s cynical policies, as Reagan repudiated those of another Republican President, Richard Nixon, whose methods so closely resemble Bush’s. Nixon also thought he could buy off his enemies by selling out his friends. It didn’t work for him and it won’t work for Bush, either. (p. 19)

The President’s popularity is at a staggering low, and it’s not just seasoned Democrats who hold him in disapproval anymore. Nevertheless, I doubt that the Republicans will produce a sound Presidential candidate anytime in the future. So, I am not holding my breath... — and I doubt any future Republican leaders would dare have the gumption to deconstruct ‘the House that Bush Built.’ (1/01/08... Maybe I stand corrected... Support Ron Paul for the GOP Presidential ticket)

In final consideration, Bruce Bartlett is a man of principle, who courageously put principle ahead of his career. His economic analysis is astute. His conclusions hit the nail on the head. His loyalty is to the best interests of his country, not his party. His principles are profoundly conservative, and his convictions compelled him to take on the Bush administration. In point of fact, Imposter cost Bartlett his job with the National Center for Policy Analysis. Who knows? This book might even win a few converts among the familiar ‘defend the GOP come hell-or-high-water’ crowd. Anyway, you should investigate for yourself, and see what the rank-and-file Republican establishment does not want you to see — How George W. Bush Bankrupted America and Betrayed the Reagan Legacy.